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ABSTRACT 
The effects of preparation  on perceived and imagined memory descriptions were examined in previous research 
(Manzanero & Diges, in press). Preparation produced more detailed reports for both internal and external memories, but 
also it reduces statements’ qualities. Now, descriptions of imagined and perceived events under two different preparation 
levels were given to be discriminated respect of their origin (source monitoring judgments). Results showed descriptions 
were more likely to be attributed by judges to perception than to imagination if descriptions contained moderate levels of 
sensorial and contextual details than if they contained high or low levels of sensorial and contextual details. Moreover, 
people use some of the same cues to judge the source of other people’s memory descriptions as they use in making 
attributions about the source of their own memories. 
 
 
Memories for perceived and imagined complex events differ in several characteristics. As Johnson and 
others have shown (e.g. Johnson & Raye, 1981; Johnson, Foley, Suengas & Raye, 1988, Suengas & Johnson, 
1988) , memories for self-generated events (i.e. dreams, fantasies, imaginations…) contain more sensorial and 
contextual details and more semantic information and less mentioning of cognitive processes than memories for 
perceived events. People use such differences to discriminate between autobiographical memories of perceived 
and self-generated events. In addition, Schooler and others (Schooler, Gerhard & Loftus, 1986; Schooler, Clark 
& Loftus, 1988) have shown that people would use these same differences in trying to ascertain the origin of 
other people’s memories. As Wells and Lindsay (1983) purposed the “memory judge”  assigns credibility to 
other people’s memories in terms of self-based judgments. “The processing of conditional information is heavily 
biased toward self-referencing” (Wells & Lindsay, 1983, pp.48 ). On the other hand, other researchers (e.g. 
Trankell, 1972; Undeutsch, 1988) have applied similar attributes to the statement reality analysis in the case of 
infant sexual abuse. 
Other studies have shown that descriptions of events may reflect not only characteristics of initial 
memories for the events, but also the memorial effects of subsequently thinking and/or talking of the events 
(Johnson and Suengas, 1988; Manzanero and Diges, 1994 a), preparation of the statements (Manzanero and 
Diges, in press), multiple retrieval and retention interval (Manzanero and Diges, 1994 b), and post-event 
information (Schooler, Gerhard y Loftus, 1986). 
In the present study, we were interested in 1) the effects of preparation on witnesses’ descriptions of 
events (Manzanero and Diges, in press); and 2) the effect of witnesses’ preparation on judges’ attributions about 
the origin of witnesses’ memories. To manipulate the type of preparation in which witnesses engaged, we asked 
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them to prepare and make coherent as a whole the statements before they described the event. 
 
PHASE 1: Collection of the descriptions 
Method: A total of 64 students from the Autonoma University of Madrid participated in this first 
phase, Subjects were randomly assigned to four groups corresponding to the four different conditions. 
Perceptual Condition 
32 subjects viewed a video-taped filmed event about a traffic crash during 27 seconds. Some minutes 
later, half the subjects were asked to prepare their statements about the event before they described it. While the 
other subjects were asked to give free recall whatever they could remember in whatever order they wished. 
 
Imagined Condition 
A schematic description of the same event was given to the others 32 subjects, and they were asked to 
imagine as vividly as possible the event. Some minutes later, half of the subjects were asked to prepare the free 
recalls and the remained were asked to give unprepared free recalls in the same way as that of the perceptual 
conditions. 
 
A 2x2 factorial design was used, which included the between-subjects manipulation of two variables: 
the origin of the memory (perceived vs. imagined) and the preparation of reports  (prepared vs. unprepared). 
And, the free recall measures included: accuracy variables (sensorial and contextual details and distortions) and 
qualitative variables (explanations, length of the narrative, changes in the narrative order, reference to cognitive 
processes, dubitative expressions, impossible information and spontaneous corrections). Half the subjects were 
asked to remember a filmed traffic accident (27 secs. duration). The other subjects were presented with a verbal 
description of the accident and were asked to imagine it. Half of each group were instructed to prepare the 
reports before giving in them; the other half were not instructed to do this. Then, the reports were typed and 
analyzed by two independent trained judges in terms of the presence or absence of the quantitative and 
qualitative variables. The scoring system used to analyse the statements was developed and validated in previous 
studies (e.g., Diges, 1988) 
 
Results and discussion 
The 64 descriptions were transcribed. Two scorers evaluated the transcripts according to five 
categories: sensorial and contextual details, mentioning of cognitive processes (e.g., remember, thought, …), 
number of words, semantic information (functional explanations) and hesitant expressions were mentioned in 
each description. Both scorers agreed 100% in all measures. Initial disagreements were resolved by discussion. 
Means values for each measure are shown in table 1. A 2x2 (origin x prepared condition) mixed analysis of 
variance was performed on each measure. 
 
Accuracy measures 
Main effects for origin were found in sensorial and contextual details, F(1,60)=164.782, p<.001. 
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Imagined descriptions contained more sensorial and contextual details than perceptual ones. Also, main effects 
for preparation condition were found in sensorial and contextual details, F(1,60)=5.36, p<.05. Preparation 
produced an increase of details. No main effects were found for origin x preparation condition. 
 
 
Qualitative measures 
Main effects for origin were found in the length of the narratives, F(1,60)=20.233, p<.001; semantic 
information, F(1,60)=4.722, p<.05; and hesitant expressions, F(1,60)=6.691, p<.01. Perceptual descriptions 
contained more semantic information and more hesitant expressions, but less number of words. Main effects for 
prepared condition were found only in hesitant expressions, F(1,60)=5.874, p<.01. Prepared descriptions 
contained more hesitant expressions than spontaneous ones. There were main effects of origin x prepared 
condition only in hesitant expressions, F(1,1,60)=5.874, p<.01. Posteriori analysis (Scheffe) have shown that 
only prepared perceptual descriptions differed from other conditions (Scheffe=.561, p<.05 compared with 
spontaneous perceptual descriptions; Scheffe=.545, p<.05 with prepared imagined descriptions; and 
Scheffe=.545, p<.05 with spontaneous imagined descriptions). 
 
Figure 1. Mean scores in dependent measures 
 ____________________________________________________________________________  
 Prepared conditions 
  ________________________________________________  
 Spontaneous Prepared 
  _____________   _____________  
 P I P I 
 ____________________________________________________________________________  
Length 96.667 182.765 133.133 180.294 
Semantic inf. 2.467 2.294 3.2 1.118 
Sensorial & contextual 10.8 27.235 12.8 31.588 
Cognitive processes 2 3.353 1.8 2.294 
Hesitant expressions 0.267 0.235 1.2 0.235 
 ____________________________________________________________________________  
  Note. origin of the memory:  P = perceived, I = imagined 
 
 
Discussion 
Results show that the origin of memory descriptions —perception or imagination— significantly affects 
the accuracy features of the descriptions. Imagination-originated memories contained more sensorial and 
contextual details, which was not in the expected direction, especially given Johnson and others’ results. So, 
these results motivated a revision of the imagined instructions. This revision shows that the number of sensorial 
and contextual details may be produced by the wide description given to imagined-condition subjects. In 
addition, items to be imagined were given sequentially while items to be perceived were given in parallel, and in 
a very short interval (27 secs.). The same is true for the number of words. However, semantic information and 
hesitant expression were in the expected direction. 
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PHASE 2: Origin judgments 
Although we found few differences between prepared and spontaneous descriptions, narratives from 
perceived and imagined events were clearly different (Manzanero & Diges, in press). However, these 
differences may be produced for imagined instructions. Thus, phase 2 assessed a) whether internal and external 
features affect new subjects’ judgments about the origin of events; b) what intuitive theories subjects have about 
the characteristics of imagined and perceived events. To manipulate the memory descriptions’ features two 
descriptions of each previous phase condition were chosen. Taken into consideration were their scores in 
sensorial and contextual details and in idiosyncratic information (mentioning of cognitive processes and hesitant 
expressions), which are the main differential features as Johnson and others (e.g. Johnson & Raye, 1981; 
Johnson, Foley, Suengas & Raye, 1988, Suengas & Johnson, 1988) have shown. 
Two pair of descriptions (imagined and prepared) were given to subjects, and they were asked to judge 
their origin taking into consideration that one of both was perceived and the other was imagined. Once subjects 
had judged each description they were asked to answer some questions on their certainty of each judgment and 
about the characteristics on which they based each judgment, i.e. to give reasons for their decisions. 
 
Method 
A total of 16 students from the Autonoma University of Madrid, who had not participated in phase 1 of 
the experiment participated in this second phase. Each student judged the origin of four different narratives from 
two pair of descriptions in which one was imagined and the other was perceived. 16 different pairs of 
descriptions were judged. 
 
Results and discussion 
Judgments 
Figure 2 shows the overall frequencies of subjects’ responses. Subjects differentiated correctly 
perceived from imagined descriptions 62.5 % of the cases. However, subjects could reliably differentiate 
perceived from imagined when pair of descriptions included one prepared and other spontaneous memory 
descriptions (overall mean correct identification of origin = 75%). In contrast, they could not differentiate when 
both descriptions were spontaneous or both were prepared. Thus the overall results indicated that subjects’ 
judgments were affected by the preparation of the descriptions. Or, in other words, they were affected by the 
number of sensorial and contextual details and idiosyncratic information. As figure 3 shows, descriptions were 
more likely to be attributed by judges to “perception” than to “imagination” if descriptions contained moderate 
levels of sensorial and contextual details than if they contained high or low levels of sensorial and contextual 
details. 
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Figure 2. Percentage of correct responses 
 
 Imagined 
 Spontaneous Prepared 
  
 Spontaneous 50% 75% 
Real 
 Prepared 75% 50% 
  
 
 
Confidence 
Correlation between confidence and judgment accuracy were analysed. Results show null correlation, 
r=.229, f.d.=14, p>.05, which fit previous studies. 
 
Subjects’ reasons 
Subjects provided several reasons for deciding whether descriptions corresponded to perceived or 
imagined events, and these were classified according to four categories: detailed descriptions, length of the 
descriptions, presence of hesitant expressions, and others. 100% of the subjects mentioned the number of details 
as a reason for their decision. But the real effect of this factor on imagined and real descriptions varied from one 
subject to the other. 62,5% of the subjects had correct knowledge of it, they judged correctly the origin of the 
descriptions. 37,5% of the subjects had erroneous knowledge of it (v.g., memories from imagined events should 
be more detailed that from real events), they judged erroneously the origin of the descriptions. 15,6% of the 
subjects reported that they believed events had been imagined if the description contained hesitant expressions 
or sounded vague. In contrast, 9.4% subjects reported that events had been perceived for the same reason. The 
length of the descriptions was mentioned in 29,03% of the total. Subjects reported that events had been 
perceived when descriptions were large (16,13% of the reasons); and that events had been imagined for the same 
reasons in 12,9% of the reasons. 
 
Discussion 
In summary, it may be when descriptions are at the same preparation condition that subjects are not 
able to distinguish the origin of the events. Furthermore, when subjects compare descriptions at different levels 
of preparation they are able to distinguish the origin of the events. In other words, when the features of the 
descriptions are more different (spontaneous condition) and when they are less different (prepared condition) 
subjects don’t differentiate imagined from perceptual memory descriptions. 
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Figure 3. Mean scores of sensorial and contextual details and of idiosyncratic information in each type of description; 
and their classifications with respect to the pair compared 
Note. IE=spontaneous imagined, IP=prepared imagined, RE=spontaneous real, RP=prepared real 
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Figure 3 shows overall means of sensorial and contextual details and of idiosyncratic information for 
each type of description. As it seems, descriptions were more likely to be attributed by judges to perception than 
to imagination if descriptions contained moderate levels of sensorial and contextual details than if they 
contained high or low levels of sensorial and contextual details. The results were not in the expected direction, 
especially given Johnson and others’ results. Albeit if we take into consideration common sense theories on 
credibility, results are in agreement with what says “all extreme is not from true —reality—” (v.g., subject 
number 4 affirmed that “the narrative nº 48 is describing too much detail, so it should be imagined”). In the 
opposite, a narrative described with very few details would be considered as unreal. These common sense 
theories also fit in with subjects’ reasons for deciding whether descriptions corresponded to imagined or 
perceived events. When two spontaneous descriptions were compared, subjects presented great problems in to 
deciding. Spontaneous perceived descriptions contained moderate levels of sensorial and contextual details and 
of idiosyncratic information, the same was to spontaneous imagined descriptions. So, both would be considered 
as likely to be perceived. Judgments would be assigned by chosen. 
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The same would be when two prepared descriptions were compared. But, in this case, both descriptions 
would be considered as likely to be imagined. Prepared perceived and imagined descriptions contained too high 
or too low levels of sensorial and contextual details. Now, both descriptions presented similar levels of 
idiosyncratic information. Furthermore, it is interesting to point out that subjects affirmed they based their 
decisions on the same variables proposed by Johnson and others (e.g. Johnson & Raye, 1981; Johnson, Foley, 
Suengas & Raye, 1988, Suengas & Johnson, 1988) and Schooler and others (Schooler, Gerhard y Loftus, 1986). 
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